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To understand better the differences in power between 
subunits, this paper examines the relationship between 
perceived departmental power and the extent to which 
departments appear to share important organizational 
values with top management. Critical contingency per- 
spectives on intraorganizational power are used as a cat- 
alyst for exploring similarity of organizational values as 
an additional determinant of power. Interview and survey 
data from a quick-service restaurant chain and a robotics 
company are used to provide support for the role of per- 
ceived similarity in values for determining power. Per- 
ceived value congruity between department members and 
top managers, examined from the perspectives of both 
groups, was found to account for unique variance in de- 
partmental power when controlling for the effects of crit- 
ical contingencies. An objective measure of the similarity 
of values between department members and top man- 
agers, however, was unrelated to departmental power.' 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last ten years the coalitional models of resource de- 
pendence (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1974) and strategic contin- 
gencies (Hickson et al., 1971) have dominated research on 
departmental power. It has been suggested that without the 
resource dependence and strategic contingency research 
there would be no literature on departmental power (Clegg, 
1975). While the coalitional approaches offer some insight 
into power, there are facets of departmental power that these 
models do not address. In particular, the models do not ex- 
plore the impact that shared values have on the ebbs and 
flows of subunit power. 
Several researchers have argued that departmental power 
depends on a subunit's ability to control critical contingencies. 
Critical contingencies is an inclusive term used here to ex- 
press both the resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1974; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1974) and strategic contingencies 
perspectives (Hickson et al., 1971). 
The present research serves to supplement the critical con- 
tingencies explanations of power by providing a value-based 
explanation of subunit power. Like the contingencies ap- 
proaches, a value orientation is used to attempt to explain 
departmental power outside the purview of hierarchical au- 
thority and functional responsibility and is thus most appro- 
priate in situations characterized by dissent, ambiguity, and 
instability. 
According to a value-based explanation of power, influence is 
shaped by the beliefs of the social players. This orientation is 
a social-psychological explanation of power in which the 
sharing of organizational values between those in specific de- 
partments and top management is explored as a determinant 
of subunit power. It is argued that departments whose orga- 
nizational values are perceived to be congruent with those of 
top management will possess power. Further, power is 
ascribed to departments in which employees independently 
identify the same subsets of critical organizational values as 
top managers. Finally, it is suggested that value congruence 
will predict subunit power when controlling for the effects of 
critical contingencies. 
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Role of Value Congruity 
Pondy (1977) hypothesized that intentionality, appearance, 
and language are important psychological factors that com- 
plement structural explanations of power. More recently, 
Walsh et al. (1981) have suggested that value systems serve 
to justify and enhance the power of some groups rather than 
others. They noted that through values, power structures de- 
velop and are legitimized. In this paper, the structural expla- 
nations of power are supplemented by a value-based, 
social-psychological explanation of power in an attempt to 
synthesize examinations of intraorganizational power. 
Following the approach of early theorists, in the present in- 
vestigation power is examined at the departmental level (Cro- 
zier, 1964; Perrow, 1970) and is viewed as a product of the 
social setting (Emerson, 1962). Political power is defined as 
the ability of a department to exert control over or affect 
various issues beyond the level of legitimate authority. The 
definition is consistent with those used by critical contingency 
theorists and others concerned with subunit power 
(Tushman, 1977; Wrong, 1979; Pfeffer, 1981a). 
Extensions of the Critical Contingency Models 
An examination of the congruence of organizational values 
permits an elaboration of the theoretical work of the contin- 
gency theorists who have assumed or suggested its role but 
have not explicitly incorporated values into empirical tests. 
Value congruity contributes to the critical contingencies per- 
spectives by offering an explanation for why different defini- 
tions of external contingencies emerge. 
Organizations consist of different coalitions of interests 
(March, 1962) with diverse values that guide and inform their 
assessments of the external environment. Since departments 
do not uniformly share the same definitions of critical contin- 
gencies, they cannot be expected to agree on which depart- 
ments have the capacity to control and manage the 
environment. Thus the question of which subunits define the 
critical uncertainties for the organization becomes the key to 
determining which units have influence (Salancik and Pfeffer, 
1977). Once a subunit can define what the critical environ- 
mental unknowns are, it can shape the power relationships of 
the firm by enhancing the influence of some units while di- 
minishing the power of others. 
It is suggested here that one of the conditions necessary for 
subunits to define critical contingencies is their expressing 
organizational values similar to top management's. A depart- 
ment improves its chances of influencing other subunits 
when it is in a position to define what is critical, and this op- 
portunity is more likely when the subunit expresses con- 
sensus on values held by members of the dominant coalition 
in top management. In this view, the definition of resources 
and contingencies is influenced by the sharing of values, 
which facilitates the social construction of reality. 
Value congruity places the department in a position to be in- 
volved in preliminary and possibly covert decision making that 
may precede information dissemination and exclude other 
departments from the decison-making process (Lukes, 1974). 
That is, by sharing values with top management, a select de- 
partment has already determined what is or is not a critical 
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contingency, circumventing interdepartmental bartering for 
power. Gaining other departments' cooperation or compliance 
because a department has control of a critical externality is 
replaced with the possibility that the department shares 
values with executives and thus constructs a definition of 
what is critical that may not fit with real environmental cir- 
cumstances. 
Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) noted that the ability to define 
what is critical is the key to an organization's aligning itself 
with its environment. It is possible, however, for a value-con- 
gruent department to define critical contingencies that do not 
reflect the important issues facing the firm and thus con- 
tribute to the organization's misalignment with the environ- 
ment. While value congruity may explain departmental power, 
it may also explain why a firm does not adapt, at least in the 
short-run, to critical factors in the environment. 
Some contingency theorists make a compelling argument 
that power shifts with changes in the organizational environ- 
ment (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), 
while acknowledging that power also has an enduring quality. 
As the environment changes, so does a subunit's ability to 
control critical uncertainties; however, the power of the sub- 
unit may not be altered when top management shares orga- 
nizational values in common with the department and thus 
considers it influential, regardless of its ability to control un- 
certainties. Similarly, a department may not have power if top 
management does not value the same organizational means 
and ends, regardless of whether the subunit is capable of 
controlling uncertainties. 
Contingency theorists contend that situational power can be 
extended to other contexts and sustained over time. By 
gaining power, subunits have access to information that 
allows them to determine what resources will be critical in 
the future. This argument accentuates the influence of history 
and draws attention to the role of sharing and transmitting 
organizational values. Departments acquire knowledge from 
top managers about the important organizational values; 
these preferences, as well as control of information, influence 
how the subunits define critical problems. 
VALUE CONGRUITY 
The importance of shared values in organizational functioning 
is in itself not new. SeIznick (1957) argued that the true task 
of leadership is to create a social structure that embodies se- 
lect values. In addition, he contended that after establishing 
values, the organization works to maintain them in the con- 
text of a changing environment. The role of shared meanings 
in the politics of organizations is examined in the literature on 
organizational paradigms (Lodahl and Gordon, 1972; Brown, 
1978; Pfeffer, 1981 b). Pfeffer (1981b) argued that consensus 
on shared meanings is used by top management to control 
and rationalize decision making, particularly decisions that are 
in conflict with the ability to control resources. 
Much of the recent literature on organizational culture ac- 
knowledges the guiding and directing role of values in the 
functioning of the organization. Values are considered a pri- 
mary component of an organization's culture (Pettigrew, 
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1979; Sathe, 1983; Schein, 1985), and congruence has 
emerged in two distinct conceptualizations (Enz, 1986). In one 
view of value congruity, called perceived value congruity, 
congruence is treated as a purely perceptual construct that 
captures the espoused, recognized, explicitly stated, and so- 
cially defined levels of consensus defined by departments 
and executives. This view of congruity is illustrated in the 
treatment of values advocated by Schein (1985), in which 
values are conscious and explicitly articulated to serve norma- 
tive or moral functions. Hence, for there to be perceived value 
congruity, department members must make comparisons be- 
tween the values held in and by their department and those 
believed to be held by the top-management team. Top man- 
agers must also assess the degree of similarity they perceive 
to exist between their team and each functional unit. 
A second way to characterize value congruity is to determine 
consensus indirectly by comparing the values of functional 
groups to those of top management and assess what is here 
referred to as latent value congruity. Latent value congruity 
does not require the groups of actors to speculate on simi- 
larity, and in fact allows for the possibility that organizational 
actors may be unaware of similarities in the value orientations 
of other groups. Assessing latent value congruity captures the 
underlying, unrecognized, but similar values of departmental 
members and top managers. In this study, departmental and 
top-management value sets were compared analytically; the 
parties were not asked directly to evaluate or articulate simi- 
larity. Perceived value congruity and latent value congruity 
were examined separately. 
Organizational Values Defined 
Organizational values are defined here as the beliefs held by 
an individual or group regarding means and ends organiza- 
tions "ought to" or "should" identify in the running of the 
enterprise, in choosing what business actions or objectives 
are preferable to alternate actions, or in establishing organiza- 
tional objectives. Some organizational theorists have treated 
values as prescriptive beliefs or preferred states (Ranson, 
Hinings, and Greenwood, 1980; Beyer, 1981; Sproull, 1981). 
Kluckholn (1967: 395), however, regarded values as concep- 
tions of "the desirable which influences the selection from 
available modes, means, and ends of action," and Rokeach 
(1968: 10) saw them as a preference "for one mode of be- 
havior over an opposite mode, or a preference for one end- 
state over an opposite end-state." The present definition of 
values is consistent with the value conceptualizations of nu- 
merous authors who combine an emphasis on means and 
ends with an ordering of preferences (Rose, 1956; Kluckholn, 
1967; Rokeach, 1968). 
Importance of Top Management's Values 
The value approach to power relies on top managers as the 
reference group to which congruity is measured, because the 
assumptions and values of top management guide and direct 
perceptions and interpretations of the organization and the 
environment (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). According to 
Schein (1985), top managers strive to communicate their or- 
ganizational values to employees in order to shape behavior 
and direct the firm. Thus, the values of the executive group 
287/ASQ, June 1988 
This content downloaded from 132.236.173.158 on Thu, 11 Sep 2014 16:48:02 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
are a key factor in understanding what drives intraorganiza- 
tional power. 
Powerholders tend to seek out those with similar values as 
successors, specifically to preserve their values and, indi- 
rectly, because they are comfortable with persons who are 
like themselves (Stinchcombe, 1968). When a department 
shares the important values with top management, it is re- 
garded as "like" the top-management team and therefore 
worthy of trust. The greater the similarity of organizational 
values between those within a department and top manage- 
ment, the more likely are the executives to view the depart- 
ment as having control over organizational activities. The 
influence of the value-congruent department poses no ob- 
vious threat to top managers and assures them that their 
preferences for the operation of the firm will be supported. 
Other departments influenced by the social setting acknowl- 
edge the position of the value-congruent group, and the de- 
partment itself operates with greater assurance and control. 
Value sharing between top management and a department 
increases the probability that the department has greater ac- 
cess to information, communicates more often with execu- 
tives, is trusted by and attractive to top management, and is 
thus in greater control and more secure in its organizational 
actions. All of these outcomes of the congruence of values 
suggest heightened power. Whether this power is real or 
imagined is not important, however, since similarity in how 
the department and the executives see the organization will 
most likely lead to similarity in desired behaviors and levels of 
influence. 
Departments that view themselves as similar to top manage- 
ment on organizational values will operate as if they are pow- 
erful. Believing themselves to be value-congruent with top 
management may lead department members to feel they 
have a right to guide or control those who do not have the 
"correct" view of what is desirable for the organization. An 
arrogance of beliefs coupled with security in one's position 
with top management may drive members of the department 
to believe their department deserves influence over other de- 
partments. Over time, this belief becomes institutionalized 
and other departments accept it as a given. 
Hypotheses 
In light of the literature, it is hypothesized that sharing similar 
values with top management will be associated with in- 
creased power of the congruent department relative to other 
departments. The first hypothesis highlights the dual percep- 
tual processes of departments and top managers ascribing 
power based on beliefs of value congruence. The second hy- 
pothesis also examines the relationship between value con- 
gruity and departmental power but relies on a nonperceptual 
approach to ascertaining similarity. 
Hypothesis 1: Top managers will ascribe more power to depart- 
ments they believe share similar organizational values (perceived 
value congruity). Departmental members who believe their own de- 
partment to have organizational values that are similar to top man- 
agement's (perceived value congruity) will ascribe more power to 
their own department. 
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Hypothesis 2: Top managers who independently select the same 
set of important organizational values as a department's members 
will ascribe more power to that department (latent value congruity). 
Department members who independently select the same set of 
important organizational values as top managers (latent value con- 
gruity) will ascribe more power to their own department. 
The third hypothesis addresses whether value congruity pro- 
vides any additional explanation of departmental power 
beyond that provided by a critical contingencies explanation. 
It is expected that top management's and department 
members' beliefs about value congruity will account for sig- 
nificant variation in the power they ascribe to the department, 
controlling for their assessments of the department's ability 
to control critical contingencies. The incremental explanatory 
power of value congruity, both latent and perceived, is hy- 
pothesized to exist regardless of the way in which value con- 
gruity is measured. 
Hypothesis 3: The value congruity between members of a depart- 
ment and top management will account for significant variation in 




Two organizations were selected for study: the corporate 
headquarters of a quick-service chain of restaurants and a ro- 
botics company. These organizations seemed ideally suited to 
the research question because both operate in competitive 
growth markets faced with environmental uncertainties, and 
both have stable top-management teams. In addition, the or- 
ganizational charts reveal that both of the organizations have 
flat, functional department designs in which no department is 
higher in the organizational hierarchy than any other depart- 
ment. 
The organizations were also chosen because of their relatively 
small size and diversity of work-unit activities. The robotics 
firm employed 100 persons and the restaurant firm had a 
staff of 625 employees. Selecting small organizations allowed 
for the examination of each corporate department and insured 
that employees would be reasonably familiar with the activi- 
ties of various departments. In addition, every employee had 
some familiarity or contact with top management. Data were 
collected through interviews, followed by company-wide 
questionnaire surveys. Analyses were performed at the de- 
partmental level, and all departments (N = 15 robotics firm, 
N = 14 restaurant firm) in both companies were included in 
the study. 
Each company identified members of its top-management 
team and provided the researcher with a list. Typically, top 
managers held the titles of president, vice president, officer, 
or director. Each member of the top-management team, with 
the exception of the presidents, had reporting responsibility 
for the activities of a department. 
Interviews 
The first stage of data collection involved structured, open- 
ended interviews with 81 individuals: 48 from the restaurant 
chain and 33 from the robotics company. All top managers 
and CEOs were interviewed. In addition, employees were 
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selected randomly from each department to participate in this 
stage of the research. 
Ten open-ended questions and seventeen structured probes 
were used to focus on values, critical contingencies, and 
power. All interviewees were asked to list the most and least 
important values a company should have in running a busi- 
ness. Respondents were then given a list of value statements 
and asked to sort them according to desirability. Several 
questions asked about the degree of similarity between the 
individuals' values and those of their own department, other 
departments, and top management. 
To investigate critical contingencies, interviewees were asked 
to list what they felt were the most critical and important 
problems facing their industry and organization. Probing 
questions focused on how the companies dealt with the crit- 
ical problems and which departments were most involved or 
necessary in solving the problems. In addition, respondents 
were asked to identify things that were the most unpredict- 
able or uncertain in their industry. Probing questions were 
used to distinguish whether unknowns occur regularly or 
have a consistent pattern. Following the model of Hinings et 
al. (1974), problem areas found to have unpatterned variation 
were considered the most relevant uncertainties for the orga- 
nizations. Finally, as a means of capturing critical contin- 
gencies, interviewees were asked to identify the resources 
that departments provide the company. Probes focused on 
the importance, criticality, and scarcity of the resources. 
To examine power, the interviewer asked questions about 
which departments have the ability to affect the outcomes of 
other departments, why, and when. Power issues were iden- 
tified during the interviews by following the guidelines of 
Hinings et al. (1974), who defined power issues as frequently 
mentioned facets of the organization in which more than one 
department is involved. Information on the degree of overall 
influence of each department was obtained through probing 
questions. 
Use of interviews to gain information was essential, since the 
variables are based on cultural knowledge or meanings 
learned, revised, maintained, and defined in the specific orga- 
nizational context. The pitfall of existing studies of contin- 
gencies and values is reliance on contingencies or values that 
may not be relevant or critical for the subjects under study. 
The interviews were used to understand the constructs and 
develop lists of values, contingencies, and power issues for 
use in the multi-item survey measures, so as to avoid making 
inappropriate assumptions. 
A single researcher coded the interview data, after tran- 
scribing each interviewee's responses to each question and 
determining the frequency of various themes, values, or 
power issues. All interviews were coded twice as a check on 
the reliability of the categorizing. Coding disputes were 
present in less than 2 percent of the cases and were resolved 
by an independent judge. Reliability and validity of the coding 
were enhanced by following the suggestions of Crittenden 
and Hill (1971), who recommended that interviews be con- 
ducted by a single investigator to reduce interviewer vari- 
ability in data collection. In addition, an affect checklist was 
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used to record any unusual dynamics in the interview that 
might bias the interviewee's statements or the interviewer's 
interpretation. 
All of the measures in this study were developed or modified 
as a result of the interviews, which were used to improve 
conceptual clarity and understanding of the constructs and to 
provide contextual information for the development of the 
questionnaire. None of the interview data were directly used 
for hypothesis testing. The data analysis was based on infor- 
mation collected on the measures in the survey stage of the 
research. 
Questionnaires 
The second stage of the study involved the administration of 
a structured questionnaire distributed to all employees by in- 
traoffice mail. An additional set of questions was mailed di- 
rectly to the top managers, soliciting their views on each 
department. All respondents were guaranteed anonymity, and 
completed surveys were returned directly to the researcher 
by mail. 
In the restaurant firm, 356 persons (57 percent) responded, 
representing all 14 departments and 15 top managers. All de- 
partments in the company were represented by more than 
ten departmental members' responses. In the robotics firm, 
a total of 58 persons (58 percent) responded, representing all 
15 departments and 16 top managers. The response rate for 
top managers was 100 percent. Because all departments in 
the two organizations (N = 29) were included in the study, no 
group of personnel was excluded. 
Aggregation. The unit of analysis for this study was the de- 
partment. To arrive at departmental scores for each of the 
variables, the responses of departmental members were 
summed and averaged to arrive at departmental means, in 
accordance with previous studies (Hinings et al., 1974; 
Hackman, 1985). Excluded from each department's mean 
score were the responses of the vice president or director 
who served as the representative of the department on the 
top-management team. Using the aggregated responses of all 
departmental employees avoided the problem of managerial 
bias attributed to previous research that relied exclusively on 
the perceptions of department heads (Clegg, 1975). To arrive 
at a top-management score for each firm, a similar procedure 
was followed in which each executive evaluated all of the 
firm's departments. Top managers' scores were summed and 
averaged for each department. 
Following the logic of Perrow (1970), all responses of depart- 
mental employees were weighted equally. The use of depart- 
mental means controls for departmental size variation within 
and across the two firms. In addition, aggregating a large 
number of respondents' perceptions of the department to ar- 
rive at departmental scores provides findings that are less 
distorted by individual biases (Provan, 1980). Finally, aggre- 
gating employee and supervisor scores to arrive at depart- 
mental means is a responsibile approach to reporting data at 
the subunit level (Van de Ven and Ferry, 1980). 
Multiple respondents. Glaser and Strauss (1967) advocated 
the use of multiple comparison groups to cross-validate data 
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collection. In the present study, measures of all of the vari- 
ables were obtained for independent respondent groups. One 
respondent group consisted of departmental employees eval- 
uating their own department's value congruity with top man- 
agement, control of critical contingencies, and general and 
issue power. The other group consisted of top managers who 
evaluated these same variables. Although reliance on indi- 
viduals' perceptions of their own departments would not rep- 
resent the traditional problem of self-report bias, because 
respondents were reporting on their departments Father than 
themselves, it was felt that including top management's eval- 
uations of each department would represent a theoretically 
useful source of information as well as a check on validity. 
Measures 
Perceived and latent value congruity. A list of organizational 
values developed by the author, supplemented by items from 
England's (1975) value measure and modified by information 
from interviewees, were used to measure value congruity. 
Values are relative phenomena best suited to comparisons of 
one value to another (Rokeach, 1973). Given that preference 
statements are comparative, the list of values was shortened, 
as a result of the interviews, to only those regarded as most 
desirable. A rank-order approach was used, in which respon- 
dents prioritized values a company should have in running a 
business. Only the value items subjects most frequently 
ranked as important were used to measure value congruity. 
By summing only the subset of value statements regarded as 
most important, separate value-similarity measures were ob- 
tained for each company. A total of six value statements were 
used to measure congruity in the restaurant chain and seven 
statements in the robotics firm (four of the values were held 
in common by the two firms), as shown in Table 1. 
Perceived value congruity was measured on the question- 
naire by asking respondents to indicate the degree of simi- 
larity between their department and top management on 
each of the organizational values. On a separate survey form, 
top managers were asked to indicate the degree of perceived 
Table 1 
List of Organizational Values 
Values 
Particular to Particular to Common to both 
restaurant chain robotics company organizations 
Efficiency: Company growth: Ethics: 
Producing the product with minimal An increase in various facets of a Concern for the honesty and 
effort, waste, and expense. company, such as assets, sales, integrity of all employees in 
and market share. conducting company activities. 
Employee development: Industry leadership: Superior quality and service: 
Expanding the skills and abilities of Being considered by everyone in the Making a good product and 
the employees. industry to be the number one addressing all the needs of the 
company (the best) in the industry. customer in as fast and friendly a 
way as possible. 
Survival: High morale: 
Staying in business. A positive feeling for the company, a 
feeling of belonging. 
Professionalism: 
Behaving in a business-like manner. 
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Role of Value Congruity 
similarity between the top-management team and each de- 
partment on the value items. A 7-point scale was used, with 
response ranging from "very dissimilar" (1) to "very similar" 
(7). A "don't know" response was provided and was scored 
as missing data. The measure of perceived value congruity 
emphasizes the individual's definition of similarity and re- 
quires a conscious assessment of the degree of value con- 
gruity. The reliability of the measures of perceived value 
congruity with top management was obtained using Cron- 
bach's alpha. A Cronbach alpha of .83 was obtained for the 
restaurant chain and an alpha of .88 was calculated for the 
robotics firm. 
The same list of values developed for the perceived measure 
was used to measure latent value congruity, the degree of 
unrecognized congruity between a department's values and 
those of top management. A frequency distribution of the 
most important values (i.e., ranked first in the interviews) was 
obtained for each department and top management. Latent 
similarity was then calculated by comparing frequency distri- 
butions between each department and top management on 
the various value items, using an index of net difference, de- 
veloped by Lieberson (1 976) to calculate a similarity score be- 
tween two groups on a ranked value. Net similarity was 
measured by subtracting Lieberson's index of net difference 
from one (1 - NDxy = Net Similarity). The Appendix 
presents a detailed formulation of the index. 
Critical contingencies. Table 2 summarizes the unique, unpre- 
dictable, and critical problems facing the firms studied, as 
determined during the interviews. To measure each 
department's ability to control these problems, respondents 
were asked to indicate the degree to which their department 
controls each of the problems for the company. A 7-point 
scale ranging from "does not control" (1) to "controls com- 
pletely" (7) was used. A "don't know" response was also 
available and was coded as missing data. Top managers were 
also asked to indicate, using the same scale, the degree to 
which each department was able to control the critical 
problems. 
Table 2 
List of Critical Problems 
Critical Problems 
For restaurant chain For robotics company 
Determining customer needs Customer ignorance of the product 
Turnover Product quality and reliability 
Financial stability Long-range planning 
Attracting sound franchisees Determining customer wants 
Managing and maintaining growth Company image and reputation 
Name recognition and company Recruiting and training 
image 
Attracting and retaining employees Staying current on technological 
changes 
Staying a step ahead of the Competing with other companies 
competition (innovative) 
Maintaining quality, service, Monitoring and controlling costs 
cleanliness, and atmosphere 
Increasing profitability 
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To measure the reliability of this multi-issue measure, Cron- 
bach alphas were calculated separately for each firm. The 
measure of control of critical contingencies yielded a reliability 
coefficient of .80 for the restaurant chain and .78 for the ro- 
botics firm, thus verifying the degree of internal consistency 
of the measure regardless of the firm studied. 
Departmental power. Empirical work on perceived power has 
historically relied on either a general or an issue-based mea- 
sure of power (Provan, 1980). One group of researchers has 
used a general measure of perceived departmental power 
that is intended to capture overall influence (Perrow, 1970; 
Salancik and Pfeffer, 1974; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974). Some 
have argued, however, that a general measure is inadequate 
for capturing the diversity and complexity of power relation- 
ships (Hinings et al., 1974; Provan, 1980). Hence a number of 
researchers have adopted a multi-issue approach to capture 
power in various situations or contexts (Hinings et al., 1974; 
Provan, Beyer, and Kruytbosch, 1980; Hackman, 1985). 
In the present study, both general and issue-based measures 
were used. A general measure of power similar to that used 
by Perrow (1970) was obtained by asking, "In general, how 
much influence do you feel your department has in your 
company?" A 7-point scale, ranging from "no influence" (1) to 
a very great deal of influence" (7) was used. A "don't know" 
response was available and was coded as missing data. Top 
managers, using the same scale, were asked to indicate the 
general influence of each department. Table 3 lists the power 
issues identified from the interviews, in accordance with 
Hinings et al.'s (1974) conceptualization of power. Power 
issues were frequently mentioned facets and outcomes of 
the organization in which more than one department had the 
ability to be involved. The issue-based measures capture the 
multidimensionality of power. In this section of the survey re- 
spondents were told that the researcher was "interested in 
your views concerning your own department's ability to influ- 
ence the outcomes of various issues." Respondents were 
Table 3 
List of Power Issues 
Power Issues 
Common to 
For restaurant chain For robotics company both organizations 
Major capital When product will be Enhancement of a 
expenditures shipped company reputation 
(acquisitions of 
stores) 
Recruiting, training, Ability to alter Creation of a unique 
and employee customer culture 
development satisfaction 
Quality, service, Development of policy Long-range planning 
cleanliness, and and changes in policy (future direction) 
atmosphere 




Introduction of new 
products 
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Role of Value Congruity 
then asked to indicate the ability of their own department to 
affect the outcomes of each power issue. Top managers 
were asked to indicate each department's ability to affect 
each of the power issues. A 7-point scale was used, with re- 
sponses ranging from "no ability" to affect the issue (1) to 
"the greatest ability" to affect the issue (7). Cronbach alphas 
of .78 for the restaurant chain and .76 for the robotics firm are 
evidence of the high levels of internal consistency of this 
measure for each of the organizations. 
Preliminary Analyses 
Before testing the hypotheses, it was essential to determine 
whether power differences existed across departments and 
whether individuals in the same department were similar in 
their evaluation of their own department's power. Information 
collected in the interviews indicated that employees ex- 
pressed greater agreement about their own department's 
power than did individuals across departments. Nevertheless, 
analyses of variance were conducted on the questionnaire 
data to examine this question. If department members varied 
greatly in their perceptions of power, aggregation of scores to 
represent a collective departmental perspective would be 
misleading. 
Several one-way analyses of variance were conducted sepa- 
rately for each company to determine the nature of depart- 
mental differences. For the restaurant chain, the 
issue-oriented (F = 2.52, p < .001) and general (F = 3.45, p 
< .001) measures of power yielded significant departmental 
differences. In the robotics company, similar results were 
found for the issue-oriented (F = 2.71, p < .01) and the gen- 
eral (F = 2.92, p < .01) measure. These findings indicate that 
within-department variance is significantly smaller than 
across-department variance. These analyses suggest agree- 
ment among department members evaluating their own de- 
partment's power. Knowing that power differences exist 
across departments and that persons in the same department 
view power similarly allows for the exploration of the rela- 
tionship between value congruity and power. 
Because the measures were all perceptual and drawn from 
the same instrument, the potential for common-method vari- 
ance to exist between the value congruity and power mea- 
sures was examined by conducting a Harman (1967) 
one-factor test. An additional test for common-method vari- 
ance was conducted on the critical contingencies and power 
measures using the Harman one-factor procedure. Results of 
the Harman one-factor tests produced multiple factors from 
the variables consistent with the a priori constructs, thus re- 
ducing the possibility of common-method problems. 
RESULTS 
Value Congruity and Power 
Table 4 presents the means, standard deviations, and inter- 
correlations for all the variables. Perceived value congruity 
was significantly related to issue and general power when 
both top management and department members evaluated 
congruity and power. Top managers ascribed more issue- 
based and general power to departments that they judged to 
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Table 4 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations among All Variables 
Means 
Variable* (S.D.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Value congruity with 5.50 - 
top management (depts.) (.82) 
2. Value congruity with 4.95 .27 
departments (top mgt.) (1.35) 
3. Latent value congruity 49.84 .13 .37- 
(31.48) 
4. Control of critical 38.45 .28 .27 .40- 
contingencies (depts.) (9.91) 
5. Control of critical 35.12 .37- .16 .34- .85w 
contingencies (top mgt.) (9.61) 
6. Issue power (depts.) 38.76 .39- .39- .20 .69w .48" 
(6.24) 
7. Issue power (top mgt.) 37.49 .31 .36- .28 .83w .88w .64w 
(6.10) 
8. General power (depts.) 4.80 .72w .37- .18 .46" .53w .32 .44" 
(1.02) 
9. General power (top mgt.) 4.56 .47" .56w .31 .51 .61w .35 .60w .72w 
(1.21) 
p < .05; Up < .01; Up < .001. 
* The variable is based on perceptions of the group(s) noted in parentheses. 
be value-similar. Department members also ascribed more 
issue-based and general power to their department when 
they perceived it to share organizational values with top man- 
agement. Hence, the greater the perceived similarity on orga- 
nizational values between a department and top 
management, the greater the department's perceived power 
within the organization. 
Latent value congruity was significantly related to general 
power as evaluated by top management but not significantly 
associated with power as viewed by department members. 
Departments that independently selected the same important 
values as top management did not ascribe to themselves 
greater power. Only top managers ascribed greater general 
power to departments that selected the same values as they 
did. 
These findings provide support for the first hypothesis and 
partial support for the second. Perceived value congruity is 
related to departmental power when congruity and power are 
evaluated by either department members or top managers. 
General power was found to be more strongly associated 
with value congruity, while critical contingencies was more 
strongly related to issue-oriented power. Top managers 
ascribed greater general power to departments in which the 
members independently identified as important the same 
subset of organizational values as the executives. In contrast, 
the relationship between latent value congruity and depart- 
mental power as perceived by department members was not 
significant and thus did not provide support for the second 
hypothesis. 
Value Congruity and Critical Contingencies 
To examine whether value congruity accounts for additional 
variance in departmental power beyond that provided by con- 
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Role of Value Congruity 
trol of critical contingencies, hierarchical regressions were 
performed, taking into consideration the effects of critical 
contingencies. Table 5 summarizes the hierarchical regression 
analyses, which examined independently the variables from 
the perspectives of department members and top managers. 
In each model the critical contingencies variable was entered 
first, followed by the value congruity measure. Perceived and 
latent value congruity and issue and general power were ex- 
amined separately. 
Table 5 
Hierarchical Regression of Value Congruity and Critical Contingencies 
Departmental Perspective Top-Management Perspective 
Value congruity Value congruity 
Critical* with top Criticalt with each 
contingencies management contingencies department 
Perceived Value Congruity 
Issue-oriented power 
Standardized regression coefficients .632 .211 .829 .231 
Partial F tests 2.122 6.512- 
Overall F tests 23.613w 13.377w 86.810w 55.864w 
R2 .476 .517 .770 .817 
Change in R2 .041 .047 
General power 
Standardized regression coefficients .282 .640 .566 .454 
Partial F tests 22.95w 13.168" 
Overall F tests 6.9450 17.880- 15.690w 18.097w 
R2 .211 .589 .376 .591 
Change in R2 .378 .215 
Latent Value Congruity 
Issue-oriented power 
Standardized regression coefficients .614 - .217 .873 - .025 
Partial F tests .386 .018 
Overall F tests 23.613w 11.720w 86.810w 41.775w 
R2 .476 .484 .770 .770 
Change in R2 .008 .0002 
General power 
Standardized regression coefficients .494 .000 .590 .122 
Partial F tests .003 .530 
Overall F tests 6.9450 3.341 15.690w 7.970" 
R2 .211 .211 .376 .389 
Change in R2 .000 .013 
p < .05; Up < .01; Up < .001. 
* Derived from department members' perceptions of their own department. 
t Derived from top management's perceptions of each department. 
Departmental perspective. From the perspective of depart- 
ment members, perceived value congruity provided a signifi- 
cant unique explanation of general power. Perceived value 
congruity with top management accounted for 37.8 percent 
of the variance in general power after the effects of critical 
contingencies on power were removed. When examining 
issue-oriented power, control of critical contingencies ex- 
plained a large percentage of variance, and perceived value 
congruity did not account for significant incremental variance. 
The findings using perceived value congruity support hy- 
pothesis 3 for general power but not for issue-oriented 
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power. Latent value congruity did not account for significant 
variation in general or issue power when controlling for the 
effects of critical contingencies. 
Top-management perspective. The findings indicate signifi- 
cant partial F's for the two models of perceived value con- 
gruity when congruity is examined from the perspective of 
the top managers. Top managers ascribed more power to de- 
partments that they judged held more similar values to their 
own than they did to departments judged to hold less similar 
values: 4.7 percent of the variation in their assessments of 
issue-based power and 21.5 percent of the variation in their 
judgments of general power can be accounted for by varia- 
tions in perceived value congruity. These results indicate that 
top managers' perceptions of value congruity with a depart- 
ment uniquely explain their evaluations of departmental issue 
and general power. Latent value congruity was not useful in 
accounting for additional variation in power beyond that pro- 
vided by control of critical contingencies. Hypothesis 3 was 
thus supported when examining perceived value congruity 
but not latent value congruity. 
Company-specific analyses. Separate hierarchical regression 
analyses were performed for each organization to determine 
whether any company effects were present. Perceived value 
congruity did account uniquely for significant percentages of 
variance in departmental power when examined separately 
for each company. In the robotics firm, significant partial F- 
tests for issue power (F = 12.38, p < .01) and general power 
(F = 6.65, p < .05) from the perspective of top managers re- 
vealed the unique explanatory power of value congruence. In 
this firm, congruity was also found to account uniquely for 16 
percent of the variance in general power from the depart- 
mental perspective (partial F = 6.38, p < .05). Value con- 
gruity uniquely accounted for 12 percent of the variance in 
issue-oriented power (partial F = 10.88, p < .01) from the de- 
partmental perspective in the restaurant chain. Latent value 
congruity did not account for significant percentages of vari- 
ance in power when analyses were performed separately for 
the two companies. 
Perceived value congruity thus uniquely accounted for vari- 
ance in power when controlling for the effects of critical con- 
tingencies, even though the samples were extremely small 
and thus lacking in statistical power. These findings are con- 
sistent with those reported when the organizations were 
pooled and thus legitimize the practice in this study of exam- 
ining both companies together. 
Cross-Validation with Mixed Models 
The findings of the hierarchical regression analyses reported 
thus far have helped to clarify the influence of value congruity 
on departmental power. The measurement of both predictor 
and criterion variables, however, has relied on the same 
groups either department members or top managers. Of 
interest is whether value congruity from the viewpoint of one 
group (e.g., top management) will predict power as viewed 
by the other group (e.g., department members). Hence, as a 
final examination of incremental variance and a cross-valida- 
tion of the findings, several mixed-perspective models were 
employed. 
298/ASQ, J une 1 988 
This content downloaded from 132.236.173.158 on Thu, 11 Sep 2014 16:48:02 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Role of Value Congruity 
Hierarchical regression analyses were performed in which the 
dependent variables-general and issue power-were ex- 
plored from a different perspective (i.e., top management's or 
departments') than the independent variables of critical con- 
tingencies and value congruity. Top management's assess- 
ments of critical contingencies and value congruity were used 
in regression models predicting power from a departmental 
perspective. Similarly, departments' assessments of critical 
contingencies and value congruity were used in two models 
predicting power from the perspective of top management. 
The purpose of these analyses was to explore whether 
unique variance accounted for by value congruity from one 
reference group's perspective would help explain variance in 
departmental power as perceived by the other respondent 
group. 
The findings from the mixed-perspective analyses revealed 
that value congruity uniquely accounted for from .7 to 11.3 
percent of the variance in departmental power. The partial F- 
tests for issue-based power (F = 3.78, alpha = .06) and gen- 
eral power (F = 3.315, alpha = .08) approached significance 
when power was examined from a departmental perspective 
and value congruity from top management's perspective. 
Value congruity as evaluated by department members was 
significant in accounting for 11.3 percent of the variance in 
top management's perceptions of general power (partial F = 
4.55, p < .05) but insignificant in explaining top manage- 
ment's perceptions of issue power. Overall, the cross-valida- 
tion using mixed models proved to be a useful check on the 
incremental explanatory power of value congruity. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results of the present study provide preliminary support 
for the importance of perceived value congruity in explaining 
departmental power. While the data reported here support 
the critical contingencies argument, they also highlight the 
usefulness of examining shared organizational values in de- 
termining power. 
Value congruity as perceived by top management proved to 
be a better predictor of departmental power than value con- 
gruity as perceived by each department's members, regard- 
less of the group assessing power. It is possible that 
department members are less aware of their value similarity 
or are mistaken about the fit more often than top manage- 
ment. It is also conceivable that executives attach greater im- 
portance to the sharing of values in assessing power than do 
department members. Department members may retain an 
illusion of control by believing that power is more directly the 
result of their ability to manage unknowns. A final explanation 
for this finding is that departmental power is shaped by the 
actions and attitudes of top managers, who in turn are in- 
fluenced by their perceptions of value congruity, not the de- 
partment's perceptions of congruence. Thus, executives' 
perceptions are stronger predictors of departmental power 
than departmental perceptions. 
Differences in the assessment of value congruity as viewed 
by top managers compared to department members was evi- 
dent by the lack of association between the perceptions of 
299/ASQ, J une 1 988 
This content downloaded from 132.236.173.158 on Thu, 11 Sep 2014 16:48:02 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
similarity (r = .27). Judging from the means, department 
members perceived higher levels of value similarity than did 
top managers. The lack of a significant association between 
the perceptual measures of value congruity may be due to 
more than just differences in viewpoints of top managers and 
department members. 
While this study has concentrated exclusively on assess- 
ments of value similarity, it has not explored the espousing of 
values and the motivation behind expressing similarity. This 
area of investigation is a possible extension of the work re- 
ported here. For example, why do department members or 
top managers express or profess similarity? It is possible that 
expressing similar values is more closely linked to power than 
sharing values. Professing similarity may be a contrivance of 
department members to bolster top management attraction 
or trust in their department. By expressing similarity on 
values, department members may be hoping to manipulate 
the sympathies of top management or obtain approval and 
resources, regardless of whether their values are similar to 
those of top management. In contrast, top managers have 
fewer incentives for expressing "false" similarity and are 
more inclined to note dissimilarity. Thus, future research 
should distinguish between perceived and expressed value 
similarity. It is possible that the differences in perceived simi- 
larity reported in this study may be linked to the different 
benefits to be gained from similarity. Examination of the 
communication process is worthy of investigation to further 
refine the effects of value similarity on intraorganizational 
power. 
A conscious assessment of value similarity was distinguished 
from nonperceptual similarity of values by measuring both 
perceived and latent value congruity. The findings suggest 
that top managers' perceptions of congruity are associated 
with latent congruity (r = .37), while no significant relation- 
ship exists between perceived and latent similarity for depart- 
ment members (r = .13). Once again these findings point to 
the possibility that department members perceive similarity 
with executives but may not actually share similar organiza- 
tional values. 
The stronger association between value congruity and general 
power may be attributable to the intangible or broad nature of 
shared values and overall power. In contrast, both issue-ori- 
ented power and control of critical contingencies are directed 
toward specific facets of the work context or isolated inci- 
dents. Hence, control of contingencies may determine de- 
partmental power in specific situations, while value congruity 
explains power over a more universal and less detailed set of 
circumstances. 
An issue-based orientation to power presumes that power is 
overt and can be captured by the identification of specific 
issues. If issue power fails to capture the "real" influence 
issues, then it may be weakly related to value congruity. 
Powerful subunits may consciously conceal relevant issues 
from consideration by all departments, or department 
members may insufficiently identify relevant issues. Which- 
ever reason explains the misidentification of power issues, 
the net effect is a weaker connection between value con- 
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gruity and issue-based power. If the power issues are the 
wrong ones (i.e., non-issues), then the ability to control spe- 
cific issues (non-issues) may be less important than the more 
general ability to influence. This view suggests that general 
power is more aligned with the unspecified indicators of 
power. Given top management's likely awareness of non- 
issues, however, it seems reasonable that the findings of this 
study showed greater association between top manage- 
ment's assessments of general and issue power (r = .60) 
than between departmental evaluations of issue and general 
power (r = .32). 
The lack of significant findings for latent value congruity, with 
the exception of top management's perceptions of general 
power (r = .31, p < .05), suggests that believing in an image 
of value similarity is more powerful in predicting departmental 
influence than actually sharing values when the parties are 
unaware of the similarity. Numerous authors have argued that 
reality is socially constructed and thus is the result of shared 
understandings or interpretations (Berger and Luckmann, 
1967; Blumer, 1969; Daft and Weick, 1984). Perhaps "be- 
lieving is seeing" (Weick, 1968: 135), that is, believing value 
congruity exists may shape perceptions of departmental 
power. This finding suggests that power is a product of a so- 
cial definition of value congruity, rather than an "objective" 
calculation of similarity. 
Further research should build on these preliminary findings by 
examining the degree to which department members and top 
managers communicate values and the levels of success they 
achieve in transmitting these values. Because top manage- 
ment is likely to be a powerful group, department members 
may communicate value similarity to increase or perpetuate 
the department's standing. Top managers advocate a set of 
values to legitimate their actions (Kamens, 1977), indoctrinate 
newcomers (Van Maanen and Schein, 1979), or induce com- 
pliance and commitment (Pfeffer, 1981 b). When executives 
use values to induce conformity, it is not difficult to under- 
stand why they perceive the value-congruent departments to 
be the most powerful. Top management may wish to impose 
its values on others in the organization to ensure that the firm 
is operating in a manner consistent with its beliefs and aspi- 
rations. Thus top management may foster the political power 
of departments that succeed in communicating similar values. 
From the perspective of the department, expressed value 
similarity may be a manipulative strategy to increase power. 
Departments may believe that top management will be more 
positively disposed toward them or include them in the critical 
decision-making activities if they express similarity. Similarly, 
powerful departments maintain their power by knowing when 
and how to express similarity with top management. Other 
motives may guide perceptions of value similarity, including 
conflict or anxiety reduction. Departments may express simi- 
larity to avoid rocking the boat. By reducing conflict they may 
negotiate for greater power. Thus, research should be under- 
taken that goes beyond examining the effects of perceived 
value similarity and considers the process of proactive value 
communication. 
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Limitations of the Study 
Three limitations of this study are of particular importance to 
note. First, all top managers, except the CEOs, also super- 
vised the activities of departments. The extremely flat organi- 
zational structures that existed in the firms studied may 
hinder a clear distinction between top-management views 
and those of departments. While the numerical representa- 
tion of departments in the top-management group was bal- 
anced in this study (i.e., one executive per department), a firm 
in which the executive team is composed of more represen- 
tatives from one department than from others may confuse 
the distinction between departmental beliefs and top-man- 
agement beliefs. In addition, the top-management team was 
value congruent, making the similarity assessments between 
top management and departments appropriate. If a situation 
existed in which executives were at variance with each other, 
then intraorganizational value similarity would be less mean- 
ingful. It is possible that organizations with more hierarchical 
levels, narrower spans of control, unbalanced departmental 
representation in the top-management set, and executive 
heterogeneity may rely more on resource control than on 
value congruity to ascribe power. 
A second limitation of the study is the statistically calculated 
assessment of latent value congruity. While Lieberson's 
(1976) measure of net difference seems appropriate in this 
early stage of research on value congruence, future research 
should consider refinements that take into account that 
values are below the level of conscious awareness and may 
appear in unobtrusive ways. 
Finally, the theoretical development of the concept of value 
congruity suggests a causal connection that this cross-sec- 
tional study does not examine. It cannot be concluded that 
value sharing rather than resource control leads to depart- 
mental power. It is also impossible to conclude that value 
sharing precedes resource control in explanations of power. It 
can be concluded that value sharing as well as resource con- 
trol is associated with greater departmental power. 
The importance of the empirical results presented here on the 
role of value similarity in determining power is that they serve 
to direct theoretical attention away from strictly resource- 
control explanations. In addition, the finding that it is per- 
ceptions of shared values rather than actual shared values 
that influence intraorganizational power highlights the impor- 
tance of created realities and suggests that more theoretical 
attention be given to the force of group consensus and the 
social construction process in organizations. Now organization 
theorists can enrich the analysis of organizational value 
sharing by focusing on the value communication process and 
the motives behind it. 
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APPENDIX: Net Difference Index 
Latent value congruity was measured using Lieberson's (1976) index of net 
difference, which gives the difference between two probabilities of in- 
equality. To calculate the index of net difference, three comparisons between 
departments and top management are needed: the probability that X (any 
department's frequency) will exceed Y (top management's frequency) with 
respect to / (value statements), pr(X > Y): The probability that Ywill exceed 
X, pr(Y > X); and the probability that X and Ywill be equal, pr(X = Y). The 
index will be zero if the two probabilities of inequality are equal [pr(X = y)]; 
in this case, a net difference does not exist. The index and the derived mea- 
sure of latent value congruity are obtained using the following formula: 
NDxY = pr(X> Y1 - pr(Y>X) 
Measure of net similarity = 1 - NDxy 
n /n=i-1 
where, pr(X > ) = E XIE 
i=2 j=1 
n n =i- 1 
pr(Y>X) E YiE XI 
i=2 j=1 
The measure of net similarity was calculated by subtracting the index of net 
difference from one [1 - NDxy = Net similarity]. While the index of net dif- 
ference deals with ranked values, the difference score is a probabilistic mea- 
sure that allows for measurement intervals with arithmetic values. 
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